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I. INTRODUCTION
When I was in the sixth grade, my English teacher predicted that
within 25 years a world war would be triggered by a dispute over water. With ten years remaining, the situation does not seem immediately ominous. Yet across the world, we are facing huge water shortages. Indeed, today one in six people lacks access to safe drinking
water.1 According to the United Nations Environment Program’s
2002 Global Environment Outlook, “by 2020 world water use is esti-

Copyright © 2005 by Carolin Spiegel
* Carolin Spiegel is a 2005 graduate of Duke University School of Law.
1. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable
Development, International Year of Freshwater 2003 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.un.org/
events/water/brochure.htm.
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mated to increase by about 40%, and 17% more water will be required for food production to meet the needs of the world’s growing
2
population.” The repercussions on our environment will be even
more dire. Rivers are a key source of accessible water for all purposes. With 145 nations sharing 261 international river basins, interstate cooperative management is essential.3
Adopted in 1997, the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Non-navigable Uses of International Watercourses (“Conven4
tion”) is a strong effort to mitigate the impending water crisis by using legal means to resolve transboundary watercourse disputes.
Drawn heavily from the principles of water law from the western
United States, particularly that of equitable utilization, the Convention strives to serve as a framework for agreements on transboundary
watercourses, and may represent a codification of customary international water law.
This note traces critical western US ideas of riparian rights from
their origins in the Supreme Court of the United States to their presence in the Convention, and possible furtherance in selected river basins around the globe. The analysis begins with a discussion of western US riparian doctrines in the context of varying degrees of
territorial sovereignty and integrity, followed by an overview of the
Convention and commentary concerning its place in international water law. The principles of western US water law visible in the Convention, an excellent example of vertical borrowing, will then be
treated in a direct comparison. Finally, the ideas of the Convention,
with a focus on the principles inherited from western US water law,
will be discussed in the case studies of two comparable, overworked,
arid-region rivers, the Nile and the Colorado.

2. The United States Mission to the European Union, UNEP Chief Calls on World
Leaders to Address Global Water Crisis (Aug. 13, 2002), available at http://www.useu.be/
Categories/Sustainable%20Development/Aug1302ToepferWater.html.
3. See United Nations, World Water Development Report: Water for People, Water for
Life Executive Summary, 25 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sdissues/
water/WWDR-english-129556e.pdf.
4. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A.
Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99 (1997) [hereinafter “Convention”].
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Western United States Water Law
The doctrines of western US riparian law have contributed heavily to the four principle theories of water law, making them worthwhile to review before discussing US case law and doctrines produced. The four principle theories include absolute territorial
sovereignty, absolute territorial integrity, limited territorial sovereignty, and community of interests.
The first of these theories is absolute territorial sovereignty, synonymous with the Harmon Doctrine of 1895. During a dispute between the United States and Mexico over the Rio Grande, Attorney
General Judson Harmon advised that a State has total freedom to act
with regard to any portion of international watercourse that is situated within the boundaries of its territory, regardless of any harm its
actions may cause to other riparian States.5 This strict doctrine, favored by upper riparians,6 has never actually been put into practice.7
Indeed, the convention that resolved the Rio Grande situation was
8
based primarily on an equitable solution, not the Harmon Doctrine,
and the doctrine is generally considered to be an anachronism in to9
day’s interdependent, water-scarce world.
Absolute territorial integrity, also known as “riparian rights,” falls
at the opposite end of the spectrum and embodies the idea that an
upstream state may do nothing that might affect the natural flow
10
(quantity and quality) of the water into the downstream state. This
is akin to the “no harm” doctrine, taken in isolation; there may be no
harm done to a state’s watercourse that might affect its natural flow.
Equally severe as the absolute territorial sovereignty doctrine, the riparian rights doctrine can have a devastating effect on slower devel-

5. STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 76–77
(2001).
6. Aaron Schwabach, The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the Interests of Developing Upper Riparians, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 257, 276 (1998).
7. See id. at 111.
8. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 101–02.
9. See ATTILA TANZI & MARIZIO ARCARI, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 13 (2001).
10. Niveen Tadros, Shrinking Water Resources: The National Security Issue of this Century,
17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1091, 1103 (1996–97).
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oping upstream riparians,11 and is thus favored by downstream
12
states. Like absolute territorial sovereignty, this theory is rarely
used in practice.13 Both theories deny the needs and reliance of other
states on a transboundary watercourse, and ignore that fact that
14
statehood has duties as well as rights. These theories exacerbate differences among states and lead to a zero-sum game.15
The doctrine of prior appropriation may be tied into the absolute
territorial sovereignty or integrity theories, as it advocates the “first in
time, first in right” approach that may enhance a state’s claim de16
pending on its upstream or downstream position. This doctrine dictates that the senior water demand is fulfilled in its entirety before the
next most senior water demand may receive any water,17 effectively
18
allowing the last possible drop of remaining stream to be diverted.
19
The prior appropriation doctrine is based on use, not on land.
Limited territorial sovereignty represents a middle ground between the two extremes, and is the prevailing theory of international
20
watercourse rights and duties today. This involves the maxim of sic
21
utere tuo ut alienum non laedus, or the idea that states must respect
the rights of other states sharing the same watercourses as they all
have an equality of right. This leads to the doctrine of equitable apportionment and utilization (“equitable utilization”), supporting the
principle of sovereign equality of all states as permitting an equitable
and reasonable utilization of the flow of an international watercourse.22 A procedural law of cooperation is thus posited. This equitable utilization is deceptively simple in part because of its great
flexibility in accounting for various factors on a case by case basis.23 It
should be noted that it is not factual harm that is prohibited by the

11. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 128.
12. Schwabach, supra note 6, at 276.
13. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 135.
14. See TANZI & ARCARI, supra note 9, at 13.
15. Id.
16. A. Dan Tarlock, Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape: The Revival of Watershed Management in the United States, 6 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 167, 176 (2000).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 137.
21. “So use your property as not to harm that of another.” MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at
135.
22. Tadros, supra note 10, at 1105.
23. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 341.
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doctrine, but deprivation of a state’s legally protected interest or
24
share. The minimum flow doctrine, which protects the use of water
internal to the body of water itself, may also be accommodated in the
theory if environmental concerns are included.25
The fourth theory, community of interests, is not widely accepted.26 Developed through navigational dealings, this theory consists of a community of interests created by the natural, physical unity
27
of a watercourse. These interests include present and prospective
uses of the watercourse, in addition to concern for the health of the
ecosystem, and are influenced by a wide variety of economic, societal,
and environmental factors.28 This theory reinforces and extends that
of limited territorial sovereignty, particularly the aspect of equitable
utilization, in that it mandates a high degree of cooperation in common management and more accurately illustrates the watercourse
system as a unity shared by all riparian states.29
As discussed above as part of the limited territorial sovereignty
and community of interests theories, the doctrine of equitable utilization is arguably the most crucial in international water law today, and
was inherited to a large extent from western US water law. In the
words of an imminent scholar in the field, Stephen C. McCaffrey,
The decisions of the US Supreme Court in apportionment disputes
between US states comprise what is probably the richest body of
practice in the field of equitable utilization that exists on either the
national or the international level. Indeed, it seems likely that in
large measure the doctrine of equitable utilization owes its very existence, as well as its fundamental meaning, to that body of deci30
sional law.

From its origins in US Supreme Court doctrine, equitable utilization
has become one of the most important principles in international water law.
In 1907, the US Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of equitable apportionment in Kansas v. Colorado.31 When Colorado, the
upstream riparian, decided to begin using water from the Arkansas

24. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 329.
25. See SLAVKO BOGDANOVIC, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WATER RESOURCES:
CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION (1954-2000) 408–09 (2001).
26. Schwabach, supra note 7, at 277; IBRAHIM KAYA, EQUITABLE UTILIZATION 86 (2003).
27. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 149–150.
28. Id. at 165.
29. See id. at 168–69.
30. Id. at 221.
31. 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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River, Kansas protested, claiming protection via the prior apportion32
ment and no harm doctrines. Colorado countered with the Harmon
33
doctrine. The Court did not agree with either state, however, and
used the equitable utilization doctrine instead; stating that it must, “so
adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of rights as to secure as
far as possible to Colorado the benefits of irrigation without depriving
Kansas of the like beneficial effects of a flowing stream.”34 After
weighing the two sides, the Court decided that “equality of right and
equity” forbade the interference with Colorado’s withdrawal of water
for irrigation, as Colorado had not intruded on Kansas’s share of the
35
river.
36
In Wyoming v. Colorado, Wyoming, the downstream prior user,
37
was trying to prevent Colorado from diverting the Laramie River.
The Court again used equitable utilization to settle the issue, bypassing the strict prior appropriation regimes followed by both states, as
well as the Harmon doctrine argument again advanced by Colorado.38
Reaffirming Kansas v. Colorado, the Court stated that this “doctrine
lays on each of these States a duty to exercise her right reasonably
and in a manner calculated to conserve the common supply.”39 Similarly, in Nebraska v. Wyoming,40 in a case involving the North Platte
River, the Court refused to apply domestic law common to the states,
ruling that “strict adherence to the [prior appropriation] doctrine may
not be possible” if the allocation was to be just and equitable.41 Priority could be an important factor to take into consideration, but was
42
not determinative.
The Court further affirmed and refined the equitable utilization
doctrine in a dispute over the waters of the Vermejo River in Colo43
rado v. New Mexico. The Court-appointed Special Master rejected
the rule of priority in favor of equitable utilization.44 In validating the
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 47–48.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 114–117
259 U.S. 419, 484 (1922).
Id. at 455.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 484.
325 U.S. 589 (1945).
Id. at 618.
See id. (calling priority of appropriation a guiding principle).
459 U.S. 176, 183–188 (1982).
Id. at 180.
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decision of the Special Master, the Court noted that inefficient uses of
water would not be protected, and that senior water rights would be
considered forfeited or diminished where they have not been exercised.45 Indeed, the Court imposed on states, “an affirmative duty to
take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water supply of an
46
interstate stream.”
The Court has also occasionally enforced this doctrine on eastern
US states, which rarely have had to grapple with same issues of water
47
scarcity. In Connecticut v. Massachusetts, the Court referenced Kansas v. Colorado and applied equitable utilization in the dispute over
the headwaters of the Connecticut River, saying that all states stand
on an equal level or plane.48 Later that year, in a decision concerning
the Delaware river, Justice Holmes called water a “necessity of life”
before clearly stating, “the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas,” while rejecting both
49
the absolute territorial sovereignty and integrity theories.
The approach of the Supreme Court to the equitable utilization
doctrine appears deceptively simple. The guiding principle is that
50
states are obligated to share water resources. If a state believes that
its share of the watercourse is being adversely affected by another
state, the injured state may petition the Court to apportion the resource equitably.51 If there is no interstate agreement or Congressional scheme in place, then the Court may do so.52 However, the
state must demonstrate real or substantial harm or injury as proof of
53
its claim. Because of this, the equitable utilization doctrine is generally considered to be a downstream remedy; indeed, suits in reverse
have been motivated by a desired injunction against pending litigation by downstream states.54 If the injured state can meet this threshold, then the burden of proof is shifted to the injuring state, which
55
must present clear and convincing evidence to refute the claim. The
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.
282 U.S. 660 (1931).
Id. at 669–71.
See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342–43 (1931).
GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIVIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (2000).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 19.
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court then has to resolve the situation via equitable utilization, taking
56
into account all relevant factors. Thus each decree is fact-specific
and unique.
B. The United Nations Convention
The first important manifestation of the doctrine of equitable
utilization in international water law was in the Helsinki Rules, produced by the International Law Association in 1966.57 These rules
were a pioneer effort to create a comprehensive codification of international watercourse law, defining a watercourse as an international
drainage basin and addressing specific water issues and uses, such as
pollution, navigation, and timber floating.58 The guiding principle was
equitable utilization, and no priority was given to one factor over an59
other. However, the Helsinki Rules still received the criticism that it
was balanced in favor of lower riparians and against potentially harmful development projects,60 as Articles VII and VIII seem to give sub61
tle weight to existing reasonable uses.
The Helsinki Rules nevertheless underlie the Convention in
large part. After a series of sessions with Special Rapporteurs from
the 1970’s through the 1990’s, the International Law Commission
submitted the 1994 Draft Articles to the UN General Assembly
62
(GA), recommending the elaboration of a convention on their basis.
The Sixth Committee of the GA drafted a resolution to establish the
mandate of a Working Group, which was adopted by the GA in
1994.63 The Convention was then negotiated in the Sixth Committee
during two sessions totaling five weeks in 1996 and 1997.64 These sessions were open to UN members as well as members of specialized
65
agencies of the UN. On May 21, 1997, the Convention was adopted
by the GA with a vote of 103 votes in favor, 3 against, and 27 abstaining.66
56. Id. at 19.
57. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 52 INT’L. L. ASS’N
477, 484 (1966) [hereinafter Helsinki Rules].
58. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 320.
59. Tadros, supra note 10, at 1107.
60. Schwabach, supra note 7, at 272.
61. Helsinki Rules, supra note 57 at 492–94.
62. TANZI & ARCARI, supra note 14, at 38–41.
63. Id. at 42–43.
64. Id. at 43–45.
65. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 301.
66. TANZI & ARCARI, supra note 14, at 45.
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The Preamble of the Convention sets the document clearly
within the context of the UN Charter, as well as the Rio Declaration
67
of 1992 and Agenda 21. Its status as a framework convention is
noted, as is its goal of ensuring the “utilization, development, conservation, management, and protection of international watercourses”
and the promotion of “optimal and sustainable utilization thereof.”68
Good cooperation among states is thus essential. Part I, the “Introduction,” sets out the scope of the Convention, including “protection,
preservation, and management,”69 which is considered to be broader
than “conservation.”70 A “watercourse” is defined inclusively, though
71
excluding confined groundwater. Article 3 clarifies that the Convention is not retroactive, though parties may want to consider harmonizing prior agreements with its principles.72 As a framework convention, parties may adapt its guidelines according to the specific needs
73
of an agreement. States may not adversely affect uses of other states
without consent, and negotiation must be in good faith at the request
74
of concerned parties.
Part II, containing “General Principles” is both the most important and controversial section of the Convention. Article 5 sets out
75
“Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation,” thus incorporating the doctrine of equitable utilization as a mandate, joined by
76
the new concept of equitable participation. This was requested by
States to represent contemporary developments in the field,77 as there
is no other general principle that may adequately account for a wide
78
spectrum of factors involved. With language such as “optimal and

67. Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, G.A.
Res. 51/229, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/51/PV.99 (1997) [hereinafter Convention].
68. Id.
69. Id. at art. 1(1).
70. See TANZI & ARCARI, supra note 14, at 54 (describing the relevancy of the replacement
of “conservation and management” with “protection, preservation, and management” to the
scope of the Convention).
71. Id. at art. 2(a).
72. Id. at art. 3(1)-(2).
73. Id. at art. 3(3).
74. Convention, supra note 67, at art. 3(4)–(5).
75. Id. at art. 5.
76. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 305.
77. Id.
78. Stephen C. McCaffrey, An Overview of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 57, 61
(2000).
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sustainable utilization,”79 “participation,” and “duty to cooperate,”80
the article supports the idea of a watercourse as a shared natural re81
source in a river community, subject to public interest limitations. In
order to achieve equitable utilization, states must cooperate by taking
82
affirmative steps, either individually or jointly.
Article 6 lays out the “Factors relevant to equitable and reason83
able utilization,” similar to those enumerated in the Helsinki Rules.
These include natural (ecology, climate, geography, hydrology, conservation, and protection), functional (development, economy, existing and potential uses, effects on other watercourse states), and social
(social and economic needs, population dependency) factors, as well
as the availability of alternatives to use.84 There is no hierarchical or85
86
dering of the list, nor is it exhaustive. The article also refers back to
Article 5 and reaffirms the encouraged spirit of cooperation.87
The “Obligation not to cause significant harm” described in Article 7 requires states to “take all appropriate measures to prevent the
88
causing of significant harm to other watercourse states,” and if un89
able to eliminate or mitigate such harm, to discuss compensation.
This is an obligation of conduct, not of result, and includes the most
basic duty of international law, for one state not to cause harm to another.90 The Article also references the guidelines of Articles 5 and
6.91 There is considerable argument over which rule, equitable utilization or no harm, takes precedence, but it is probable that neither rule
92
overrides the other, as harm is likely to be an important factor in
calculating equitable utilization.93 Articles 8 and 9 focus on the obli-

79. Convention, supra note 67, at art. 5(1).
80. Id. at art. 5(2).
81. Tanzi & Arcari, supra note 14, at 103–4, 120.
82. McCaffrey, supra note 78, at 61.
83. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 306.
84. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 6(1).
85. Id. at art. 6(3).
86. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 306.
87. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 6(2).
88. Id. at art. 7(1).
89. Id. at art. 7(2).
90. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 307.
91. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 7(2).
92. Jutta Brunée & Stephen J. Toope, The Changing Nile Basin Regime: Does law matter?
43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 105, 151 (2002).
93. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 308–310; KAYA, supra note 26, at 160–61.
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gation to cooperate and exchange information readily.94 Article 10
further emphasizes the use of the equitable utilization and no harm
doctrines together in elucidating the relationship between different
types of uses, wherein “no use of an international watercourse enjoys
95
inherent priority over other uses.” However, special regard is given
to the requirements of vital human needs, including drinking water
and water necessary for food production to prevent starvation.96
Part III is “Planned Measures,” including a discussion of the
process of notification and further communication between states.97
Part IV, “Protection, Preservation, and Management,” highlights areas of environmental concerns. Article 20 mandates individual and
joint protection of ecosystems,98 while Article 21 emphasizes coopera99
tion in the reduction and prevention of pollution. Articles 22 and 23
discuss limitations on the introduction of alien species and protection
of the marine environment.100 Article 24 supports joint planning and
promoting the sustainable development of an international water101
Part V contains articles relating to “Harmful Conditions
course.
and Emergency Situations.”102
Part VI, “Miscellaneous Provisions,” includes the other contentious area of the document, relating to the settlement of disputes. Article 32, “Non-discrimination,” prevents a state from denying persons
from other countries injured by watercourse activities access to its legal system or the right to claim compensation if other arrangements
have not been set out in the agreement.103 Some states were uncomfortable with the thought of granting non-citizens nondiscriminatory
access to their judicial and administrative forums relating to transboundary watercourse harm,104 and indeed considered it an infringe-

94. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 8-9.
95. Id. at art. 10(1).
96. Statement of Understanding on Convention in Report of the Sixth Committee convening as the Working Group of the Whole, U.N. Doc. A/51/869 art. 10(2) (1997) reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 719 (1997); HILAL ELVER, PEACEFUL USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 201 (Richard
Falk ed., Transnational Publishers, Inc.) (2002).
97. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 20–26.
98. Id. at art. 20.
99. Id. at art. 21.
100. Id. at art. 22-23.
101. Id. at art. 24.
102. Id. at art. 27-28.
103. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 32.
104. McCaffrey, supra note 78, at 69.
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ment upon their sovereignty.105 Article 33 sets out the procedure for
settling disputes if parties are unable to resolve it themselves within
106
This procedure
six months and do not make other arrangements.
involves establishment of a compulsory fact-finding Commission,
which some states found objectionable because of perceived infringement on free choice of means.107 Part VII consists of the “Final
Clauses,” including provisions for entry into force upon obtainment
108
of 35 instruments of ratification.
Although the Convention was adopted by a large majority in the
109
GA, it has not yet come into force. Currently it has are 16 signatories and 12 parties.110 The vote in the GA displayed a tendency of upstream riparians not to support the Convention,111 either by voting
against it, as in the cases of Burundi, China, and Turkey, or through
112
These countries commonly felt that the equitable and
abstention.
reasonable utilization and no harm obligation would operate to protect the interests of downstream riparian states, thus offending upstream riparians resentful of any limitation on use of watercourses
that originate within their borders.113
Regardless of whether it enters into force, however, the Convention is a milestone in the development of the field of international water law,114 as it is arguably a codification of customary international
law.115 Indeed, as there are few pre-existing rules of customary international law in the field,116 the impact of the Convention is even
greater. The Convention adheres closely to the Draft Articles of the
International Law Commission, the UN organization responsible for

105. Jordan C. Kahn, 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses
of International Watercourses, 1997 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. Y.B. 178, 182 (1997).
106. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 33.
107. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 313.
108. Convention, supra note 67 at art. 36(2).
109. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
110. United Nations, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXVII/treaty41.asp
(last modified Mar. 18, 2005).
111. Kahn, supra note 105, at 184.
112. Id. at 178.
113. Id. at 184.
114. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 317.
115. See id. at 316 (“[I]t seems clear that the most important elements of the Convention –
equitable utilization, prevention of harm, prior notification, protection of ecosystems – are, in
large measure, codification of norms that either exist or, in the case of ecosystem protection, are
at least emerging.”)
116. See Schwabach, supra note 7, at 278.

SPIEGEL1.DOC

2005]

9/15/2005 10:09 AM

INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

345

the “progressive development of international law and its codifica117
tion.” The most critical elements of the convention, namely equitable utilization, no harm, prior notification, and ecosystem protection,
represent codification of existing or well emerging (regarding ecosystem protection) norms.118 Additionally, the Convention was negotiated in a virtually open forum in which any interested state could participate.119 The heavy majority of favorable votes in the GA showed
120
Moreover, the Draft
broad agreement on the principles codified.
Articles had already influenced formulation of several important
agreements concerning freshwater resources before the Convention
was drafted, indicating wide acceptance of the doctrines contained
therein.121 These agreements include the 1991 Protocol on Common
Water Resources between Argentina and Chile, the 1995 Protocol on
Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Development
Community Region, and the 1995 Agreement on the Cooperation for
the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin.122
III. COMPARISON OF US LAW AND THE CONVENTION
Comparative and international law are not often studied together. According to Professor Jonathan Wiener, “comparative and
international law may have kept a polite distance for some time, the
former offering disinterested cross-cultural understanding and the lat123
ter offering normative projects of supranational governance.”
Though it is a seldom-explored topic, there are many examples of vertical borrowing, or borrowing between national and international
law.124 The European Union and the United States illustrate vertical
legal borrowing from their member states.125 Perhaps more significantly, though, there are many examples of vertical borrowing from
national into supranational governance structures or treaties, including various aspects of intellectual property and environmental law.126
117. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 315 (quoting STATUTE OF THE INT’L L. COMM., art.
(1)(1) UN Doc. A/CN.4/4/Rev. 2 (1982)).
118. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 316.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 317.
122. Id.
123. Jonathan B. Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and
the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1302 (2001).
124. Id. at 1297, 1302.
125. Id. at 1303.
126. Id. at 1304–05.
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Indeed, international treaty negotiations are often preceded and en127
couraged by unilateral national action in the subject area. As problems are experienced more and more globally, there will be an increase in value to borrowing from national law comparables, and
benefits are likely to rise as countries gather greater knowledge of the
performance of different legal principles.128
Though much more analysis of the topic should be undertaken, it
is worthwhile to note factors conducive to vertical borrowing. It is
economically efficient to borrow, rather than invent and test a new
legal structure, particularly when dealing with delicate and irreversible environmental matters which are inevitably interconnected on a
129
global basis. In addition, there is no comparable system to international law, so horizontal borrowing is impossible. However, certain
factors may inhibit vertical borrowing, primarily that international
law is seen as distinct from national law.130 Similarly, practitioners in
the field of international law have incentive to separate the profession
from their own governments, and there may be hesitation to acknowledge borrowing for fear of accusations of favoritism.131 Finally,
there is some level of belief that international law is superior to na132
tional, an idea that is incompatible with vertical borrowing.
There is no question, however, that vertical borrowing occurred
in the present circumstance. A. Dan Tarlock, a well-known scholar in
the field, has declared that US water law is the principle model for in133
ternational water law. The doctrine of equitable utilization, an invention turned cornerstone of Western US water law, has become a
cornerstone in international water law and codified as such in the
Convention.134 The idea of equality of right that underlies equitable
utilization is clearly seen in the US Supreme Court cases. Indeed, in
the foundational case of Kansas v. Colorado, the Court stated,
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the States to each
other, is that of equality of right. Each State stands on the same
level with all the rest. . . through these successive disputes and deci-

127. Id. at 1302.
128. See id. at 1360–61.
129. Id. at 1353, 1359–60.
130. Id. at 1345.
131. Id. at 1346, 1348.
132. Id. at 1348–49.
133. A. Dan Tarlock, Safeguarding International River Ecosystems in Times of Scarcity, 3 U.
DENV. L. REV. 231, 237 (2000).
134. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 305; Convention, supra note 67, at art. 5.
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sions this court is practically building up what may not improperly
135
be called interstate common law.

This understanding of equality of right, though not equality of share,
is noted in numerous other decisions on watercourse allocation be136
tween states.
Here, US interstate common law is analogous to customary international law in terms of acceptance and weight in a federal or international context, respectively. In its Preamble, the Convention
137
references Article 2 of the UN Charter, thus affirming the significance of the ideas contained therein, namely, “The Organization is
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”138
Equality of right overlaps to a great extent with sovereign equality if
it is recognized that this entails an obligation to acknowledge the
equal sovereignties of other states.139 This focus on sovereign equality
is reiterated in Article 8 of the Convention, which emphasizes the
mandate to watercourse states to cooperate on the basis of sovereign
equality.140 Thus the equality of right baseline noted in US Supreme
Court cases on watercourse allocation exists in the Convention as
well.
Not only is equitable utilization prominently incorporated into
the Convention, the doctrine is largely unaltered from its original
formulation in the US Supreme Court. The description of equitable
utilization is the same in each setting: each riparian state has an equal
right to an equitable share of the uses and benefits of a trans141
boundary watercourse. Equitable utilization is dynamic, causing the
Supreme Court to describe it as, “a flexible doctrine which calls for
‘the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration of many
factors’ to secure a ‘just and equitable’ allocation.”142 The preceding
reference to the “many factors” corresponds well with Article 6 of the
Convention, which lays out a non-exclusive list of factors for consid-

135. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 97-98.
136. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 670–71; Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at
465.
137. Convention, supra note 67, at pmbl.
138. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1.
139. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 331 (stating equality of rights means that no state has
an inherenty superior claim of rights to the watercourse).
140. Convention, supra note 67, at art. 8(1).
141. See MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 336.
142. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 183.
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eration.143 All of the factors mentioned in Article 6 have been alluded
to, if not openly discussed, in Supreme Court decisions.
The most disputed issue before the US Supreme Court (and
144
listed in Article 6 as well) has been that of the weight of existing or
prior use, the descendent of the prior appropriation doctrine. The
Court has repeatedly declared that existing use is neither absolutely
protected, nor not protected at all.145 Equitable utilization is thus incompatible with both the absolute territorial sovereignty and integrity
theories. To the dismay of many States, then, their existing uses were
denied protection until such time as there would no longer be an equitable division of benefits and the call for relief would be rightful.146
This is reflected in the Convention, which lists existing use as the fifth
enumerated factor on a list of seven, and makes it clear that the factors employed are relative to the circumstances.147 Conservation and
avoidance of risk through alternative means have also been important
factors in the Court’s decision as seen in the imposition of an obligation “‘to employ financially and physically feasible’ measures
‘adapted to conserving and equalizing the natural flow.’”148 These fac149
tors are also noted in the Convention. Thus like that performed by
the US Supreme Court, the Convention’s weighing of the relevant
factors is flexible and situationally based.
Though the doctrine of no significant harm appears to have
originated from a general principle of law, considered as a source of
international law by the International Court of Justice,150 it has long
had a presence in Western US water law in conjunction with equitable utilization.151 A strict prohibition on causing harm would severely
limit individuals as to use of their property, and has been refuted by
152
the US courts in various areas of law. Article 7 of the Convention
appreciates this distinction as well in qualifying this prohibition on

143. Convention, supra note 67, at Art. 6.
144. Id. at art. 6(1)(e).
145. See supra notes 35–48 and accompanying text.
146. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117; see Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 467; Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 188; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673.
147. Convention, supra note 67, at art. 6(1), (3).
148. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. at 185.
149. See Convention, supra note 67, at art. 6(1)(f),
150. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 350; ICJ STATUTE art. 38(1)(c).
151. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 103–4, 117.
152. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 351; see e.g., Fleming v. Lockwood, 92 Pac. 962, 963
(1908) (rejecting claim based solely on general maxim prohibiting harm to others, and requiring
showing of negligence for plaintiff to receive damages and injunction) .
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harm to only that which is “significant” and allowing for the possibili153
ties of mitigation and compensation. “Harm” in the doctrine before
both the Court and the Convention has a broad, flexible definition,
and must be factual to meet evidentiary standards.154 It may not be of
a type prohibited altogether, but must be of serious consequence,
enough to meet a threshold where one state which believes itself to be
suffering harm will expect the other to reply in an appropriate way.155
The doctrine has close connections with the limitations on causing
“unreasonable” harm inherent in the abuse of rights and good
neighborliness principles in international law.156
This common understanding of the no significant harm doctrine
is reflected in comparable application of the US courts and the Convention of the principle as part of equitable utilization. Though both
doctrines function as independent norms, they do not compete, as
both are flexible enough to accommodate and compliment each
other. The no significant harm doctrine has been treated by the US
Supreme Court as only one factor, albeit an important one, in equitable utilization determination.157 A state may have to suffer some
harm to an existing use to permit another state to enjoy substantial
158
benefits from a new use of the watercourse. In Kansas v. Colorado,
for example, the Court admitted that the irrigation uses of the Arkansas River by Colorado had caused some level of detriment to Kansas,
but decided that the great benefit to Colorado outweighed that level
of harm.159 Article 7 of the Convention uses similar methodology,
prohibiting the causation of significant harm with appropriate measures, and may result in elimination or mitigation of such harm, or
compensation.160 As noted in Article 7(2), this is incorporated into
the framework of equitable and reasonable utilization, and the factors
161
The harm itself may fall under Article
used to determine this.
6(1)(d), “The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States” in addition the existing

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Convention, supra note 67, at art. 7.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 369.
Id. at 369.
Id. at 351.
See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618.
See MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 350–51.
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 113–114.
Convention, supra note 67, at art. 7.
Id. at art. 7(2).
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use and other factors listed.162 The overall objective of both the Court
and the Convention is to find a balance which results in the minimiza163
tion of harm to each state concerned.
Perhaps the greatest area of important difference between Western US water law and that codified by the Convention deals with the
level of attention paid to the environment. While Western US water
law has generally had little reference to environmental concerns, the
Convention addresses the issues of conservation and protection with
164
much greater force. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Convention exhibits an emerging principle of customary international law on
the subject, namely that states must protect the ecosystems of international watercourses.165 The minimum flow doctrine, which has some
influence in Western US water law, is a rather recent development,
166
dating back only about two decades. Other than the incorporation
of the ideals of the environmental movement as a non-written factor
in the determination of equitable utilization, little note of ecosystem
concerns has been made in the major Supreme Court decisions that
define the equitable utilization doctrine.167 Reflecting the more recent
international public concern for the environment, the Convention
places much more importance on the idea of the watercourse as a
shared natural resource, and devotes a chapter to the protection and
preservation of ecosystems, with Articles 20 through 25 directly addressing the area.168 Much attention is focused on reduction and control of pollution, in particular, but even estuaries are included in the
169
protection initiative. In addition, the listed factors under Article 6,
including “conservation, protection, development, and economy of
use of the water resources. . .,”170 may result in giving more protection
to environmental concerns and somewhat less weight to existing uses
than allotted by US equitable utilization doctrine. However, these at-

162. Id. at art. 6(1)(d).
163. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 327–28; Convention, supra note 67, at pmbl., art. 6 (highlighting the application of the equitable utilization factors to achieve a balance and promote the
optimal and sustainable utilization of international watercourses).
164. Convention, supra note 67, at art. 20–26.
165. McCaffrey, supra note 78, at 70.
166. Albert E. Utton & John Utton, The International Law of Minimum Stream Flows, 10
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. POL’Y 7, 9 (1999).
167. See id. at 9 (The minimum flow doctrine has greatly gained importance in recent years
as rivers have become increasingly appropriated.).
168. Convention, supra note 67, at art. 20–25.
169. Id. art. 23.
170. Id. art. 6(1)(f).
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tempts to incorporate environmental awareness have been criticized
from both directions. Many developing upper riparians view interna171
tional environmental law as an obstacle to progress, while environmentalists protest that the definition of watercourse is not broad
enough and that the focus is almost exclusively on pollution, neglecting floodplain and wetland protection.172 Regardless, the Convention
marks a significant development for the incorporation of environmental appreciation into international water law.
173
The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case marks an excellent example of
the success of vertical borrowing. Following a 1977 treaty, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia agreed to build a series of dams and barrages on
the Danube River.174 Hungary, the downstream riparian, later
stopped work on its portion of the project and tried to terminate the
treaty, claiming environmental concerns in reliance on the no harm
rule.175 However, the ICJ used equitable utilization, explicitly affirming its status as customary international law by stating, “[the suspension and withdrawal of Hungary’s consent] cannot mean that Hungary forfeited its basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of
176
the resources of an international watercourse.” Moreover, the significance of the Convention, after only four months in existence and 3
signatures, was specifically attested to in Paragraph 147:
Re-establishment of the joint regime will also reflect in an optimal
way the concept of common utilization of shared water resources
for the achievement of the several objectives mentioned in the
Treaty, in concordance with Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Wa177
tercourses.

The idea of a shared watercourse community of interest based on
equitable utilization is reaffirmed in several paragraphs.178 Thus the
equitable utilization doctrine successfully navigated first vertical borrowing from US law to the Convention, then horizontal implementation from the Convention to the ICJ.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Schwabach, supra note 7, at 279.
Tarlock, supra note 133, at 249–50.
Gabcikovo – Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia) 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
Id. at para. 15.
See id. at para. 13.
Id. at para. 78.
Id. at para. 147.
Id. at paras. 85, 150.
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IV. CASE STUDIES: FURTHER
POSSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTATION
ON THE NILE AND COLORADO RIVERS
The Nile and the Colorado Rivers are often referred to as the
two Niles, one African and one American.179 They are both long,
180
They both support increasing
much-used rivers in arid regions.
populations and competition for the waters is intense and diverse.181
Both river basins are significantly over-appropriated, but the nations
182
or states which contribute the most flow use it the least. The commonalities end thereafter, as the Nile’s major water use will continue
to be agriculture, while the Colorado will likely increasingly be used
to support vital human needs more directly.183 The primary difference, however, is that the allocation scheme of the Nile is still incomplete, compared to the comprehensive Congressional plan and Supreme Court enforcement that govern the Colorado.184
A. The Nile River
International law is considered to have much to offer to the rela185
Claimed to be the world’s longest
tions of the Nile basin states.
river at 4239 miles, the basin drains 1.1 million square miles, and
186
nourishes approximately 280 million people. The waters of the Nile
flow through ten nations: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, and
Uganda.187 A World Bank study has forecasted that the amount of
water available to each person in North Africa will have dropped by
80% in a single lifetime by 2025.188 Indeed, the population of the
Middle East, which includes several of the Nile basin states, has less
189
available water per capita than any other large region on Earth.

179. See e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, How Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt
to Global Climate Change? 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 423, 444 (2000).
180. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 444–46.
184. See id. at 444–46.
185. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 116.
186. Christina M. Carroll, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12
GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 269, 272 (1999).
187. Id.
188. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 118.
189. Tadros, supra note 10, at 1098.
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Ethiopia provides 85% of the flow of water,190 while Egypt and the
191
Sudan account for over 90% of water use. Over 80% of Nile waters
192
are used for agricultural production.
The flow of the Nile has diminished significantly over the past
193
century. As the White Nile flows north through the extensive wetlands of the Sudd Swamps and Machar marshes in the Sudan, about
194
half of its water is lost to evaporation and seepage. The Jonglei Canal project was designed to ameliorate this loss of water (and would
possibly also severely disturb the ecosystem of the region), but its
construction has been halted indefinitely because of fighting in the
area.195 Large-scale use of fertilizer and high levels of salinity have resulted in poor water quality, particularly in Egypt.196 The Aswan High
Dam was constructed to control and capture flood waters for use in
197
the dry season. However, Lake Nassar, the immense reservoir created behind the dam, permits a high level of water loss through seep198
age and evaporation (suggested to be about 12% of flow ), thus further increasing salinity of the waters.199
Existing treaty agreements governing the Nile are notably insufficient. There are no treaty agreements that apply to all its basin
200
Many treaty agreements
states, or apply to the basin as a whole.
and resulting claims were formed under British colonial rule, and
201
their validity is uncertain. In addition, even the more recent treaties
fail to adequately address the growing pollution problem.202
As the Nile scholar Albert H. Garretson stated, “The Nile basin
is perhaps the archetype of the usual historical pattern of international river basin development: early and significant development in
the delta and lower basin and later – in this instance several thousand
years later – development in the upper basin.”203 Motivated in part
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 117.
Tarlock, supra note 179, at 444.
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 120.
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 50, at 117.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, 234–35.
Id.
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 119.
See id. at 117–18.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 119–120.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 237.
Carroll, supra note 186, at 281.
Tadros, supra note 10, at 1096.
Garretson, as quoted in MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 236.
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because of a cotton scheme in Sudan, an agreement between Egypt
and the UK/Sudan on the use of the Nile waters was formulated in
204
1929. The report of the 1925 Nile Commission, on which much of
the agreement is based, stated that, “consideration of [water] levels
could not be carried to the point of precluding development in the
Sudan, but only to the point of setting a limit to the extent and rate of
this development.”205 However, the British assured Egypt its dominant share of the waters, and 48,000 million cubic meters was allocated to that country while 4,000 was designated for Sudan, for a ratio
of 12:1.206 Other colonial agreements, including that of the Owens
Fall Dam in Uganda, also made clear that their priority was to protect
207
Disputes over water rights were
barely impeded flow into Egypt.
minimized or eliminated because of overall British control of the re208
gion.
After Sudan’s independence in 1956, the country repudiated the
209
treaty and demanded an increased share of the Nile waters. At the
same time, Egypt desired to build the Aswan High Dam, whose reservoir would extend into Sudanese territory.210 This resulted in the
negotiation of the 1959 Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, which altered the ratio from 12:1 to 3:1 and fully allocated the
211
Nile flow between the two states. The agreement also established
the Permanent Joint Technical Committee, thus institutionalizing cooperation.212
The significant under-inclusion of the eight other Nile riparian
states began to cause problems as they also gained independence
from the UK. Ethiopia has never recognized the validity of the 1959
agreement,213 while Egypt has continued to assert the no harm doctrine and its historical claim to the Nile.214 For many decades, regional
statesman, particularly Egyptians and Ethiopians, warned of the

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 237.
Report of the Nile Commission, para. 37, quoted in MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, 238.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 239 (citing 1929 Agreement).
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 123.
See id.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 242–43.
Id. at 243.
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 127.
Tadros, supra note 10, at 1097.
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threat of war over Nile waters.215 Added to this was a range of
broader political disputes, both inter and intrastate, that touched on
216
Nile issues and complicated the situation. Egypt now has plans for
the Salaam Canal and New Valley Projects, both of which will require
substantial water draws from the Nile, in a quest to create “facts on
the ground” to reinforce its historic and reliance claims on the river’s
flow.217 Ethiopia has schemes for hydroelectric and mini-dam pro218
jects. The Nile flow cannot meet the demands of both Ethiopia and
Egypt, let alone satisfy the desires of all other Nile riparians.219
However, there have been important steps towards teamwork on
management of the Nile Basin that indicate an emerging spirit of cooperation. In 1992, an intergovernmental Technical Cooperation
Committee for the Promotion of Development and Environmental
Protection on the Nile (TECCONILE) was formed by the water affairs ministers of Egypt, Sudan, Congo, Rwanda, Tanzania, and
220
Uganda. This was superceded by the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) in
1999 to serve until a permanent legal framework is in place, with a secretariat located in Uganda.221 The key to success of the NBI is active
222
Strengthened
participation by all riparians, particularly Ethiopia.
by substantial funding, particularly by the World Bank,223 the NBI has
developed a series of Strategic Action Programs aimed at achieving
basin-wide cooperation by focusing on decision making on the lowest
appropriate levels.224 In 1993, Ethiopia and Egypt declared the Nile to
be a “center of mutual interest” after agreeing to cooperate on Nile
issues, and a series of meetings was held between governmental leaders on the subject.225 The theme of the Nile 2002 Conferences, held
annually beginning in 1993, was comprehensive cooperation, with
226
emphasis on relative separation from political influences.
A number of factors work for and against successful cooperation
in the Nile Basin. On the negative side, the interest in the Nile at the
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 105–06.
See id. at 129.
Id. at 128, 147.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 247 & n.102.
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 108, 135, 138.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138, 140.
Id. at 138.
Id. at 106–7.
Id. at 135.
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political level differs greatly among the countries, as national water
plans tend to be designed in isolation, and there is significant political
227
distrust and a lack of information. On the positive side, there is a
widespread recognition of the unsustainability of the region, particu228
larly as governments stabilize and population grows substantially. If
planned and executed in cooperation, a basin-wide scheme involving
production of hydroelectric power and upstream water storage could
mean considerable gain for all, including the savings of much water
now lost to evaporation.229 Additionally, donors have thus far approved of the cooperation initiative and provided ample funding with
230
few strings attached.
However, the reaction of the Nile riparians to the Convention – a
framework that supports many of the goals of the region – has been
mixed. Sudan and Kenya voted for the Convention; Egypt, Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Tanzania abstained; Burundi voted against; and Uganda
231
Ethiopia protested that giving priority to
and Zaire were absent.
the no harm doctrine would override the right to equitable and reasonable utilization.232 On the opposing side, Egypt continued to claim
that the no harm rule was the foundation of international watercourse
law and that it should not be given the same weight as equitable utilization.233 It has been suggested that the Convention’s success at balancing the interests of upper and lower Nile riparians was in fact the
234
reason for its lack of success on the ballot. Indeed, it was surprising
that Egypt abstained from the vote, considering the view that the
235
HowConvention was biased towards lower developed riparians.
ever, after the vote, Egypt’s delegate, Lamia Mekhemar, saluted the
adoption of the Convention and articulated, a “hope that the adoption of the new convention will promote better cooperation.”236 It is
important to note that none of the Nile riparians have since ratified or

227. Id. at 130.
228. Id. at 140.
229. Id. at 141–42.
230. Id. at 142–43.
231. Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Adopts Convention on Law of NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, GA/9248, May 21, 1997, available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1997/19970521.ga9248.html (last visited March 1, 2005).
232. Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 150.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 151–2.
235. Schwabach, supra note 7, at 263.
236. Id. at 263–64.
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signed the Convention,237 perhaps challenging its probable status as
customary international law in the region.
Though the Convention has been criticized by some as unsuit238
able for the Nile region because its guidelines are too vague, it is an
excellent starting point and offers much value as a framework. Foremost is the emphasis on cooperation largely devoid of political influence. The Nile basin suffers from a large disparity of political and
economic power in its members. By creating a “community of interest” situational ideal, the Convention focuses on the Nile River itself
and its outreach into its communities rather than on the diverse, individual, political players who divide its waters. In this setting, Justice
Holmes’ words in New Jersey v. New York are realized: “A river is
more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life that
must be rationed among those who have power over it.”239
As suggested above, the doctrine of equitable utilization and its
incorporation of the doctrine of no harm is fair, and hence bound to
initially please none of the parties concerned, but negotiation has a
strong possibility of mitigating fears enough to support the principle.
Indeed, the laudable NBI seems to follow the Convention to a great
extent in incorporating the equitable utilization and no harm doc240
The Convention’s chapter on environmental protection
trines.
management, Part IV, is very useful and sets out a strong plan for cooperative ecosystem preservation, as is sorely needed in the Nile Basin. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the Convention acts
as a flexible framework; it should not be expected to provide concrete
solutions, but simply to describe mechanisms that will help to achieve
them. With the ideas of the Convention in hand, amelioration of the
Nile situation is certainly possible through joint riparian planning, as
much water can be saved from evaporation and much better use can
be made of that that exists.
B. The Colorado River
The Colorado River has been called the “most legislated, most
241
Indeed, its 1,450
debated, and most litigated river in the world.”
mile flow is completely allocated among seven basin states and Mex-

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Carroll, supra note 186, at 287.
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 144; Carroll, supra note 186, at 288–90.
283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
Brunnée & Toope, supra note 92, at 152.
MCCAFFREY, supra note 5 at 286.
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ico by treaty, interstate compact, congressional statute, and US Su242
It drains 244,000 sq. miles in the US and
preme Court decision.
Mexico, and is the only major source of surface water between the Sierra and the Rocky Mountains.243 The upper basin states of Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming are less populated but contribute
most of the water, while the lower basin states of Arizona, California,
and Nevada contain a much larger population and great expanses of
244
rich agricultural land that depend completely upon irrigation. After
its journey through the states, the river then forms the international
boundary between the US and Mexico for 20 miles before passing
completely into Mexican territory and later emptying into the Gulf of
California.245 Multiple large dams on both sides of the border shunt
off almost all of the flow, and little is left to reach the delta, which has
246
suffered severe ecological loss from the depletion.
One of these dams, the Imperial, located in Arizona, diverts over
20% of the Colorado’s flow into the 80 mile long All American Canal
for use in irrigating California’s fertile Imperial Valley, a journey that
loses 70,000-90,000 acre-feet each year to seepage into an aquifer
247
The Colorado also provides more
along the US-Mexico border.
than half the water used by the growing cities of Los Angeles, San
Diego, and Phoenix.248 Before the Colorado’s development by the
US, its flow was used for irrigation in the Mexicali Valley (the southern extension of the Imperial Valley) but this irrigation is now quite
limited as the flow is so depleted.249 The burgeoning population in
Baja California, predicted to be almost 3 million by 2010, will strain
250
the waters even further.
When the Colorado was first apportioned in the Colorado River
Compact of 1922, a mass allocation scheme by Congress, its flow was

242. Tarlock, supra note 179, at 445; MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 286.
243. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 286.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See Center for Biological Diversity, Colorado River Campaign, at http://www.swcenter.org/swcbd/Programs/watersheds/lcr/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2005); Environmental Defense,
The Colorado River Delta, http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentID=2641
(last visited Apr. 21, 2005) (stating that due to water extraction upstream, the delta receives less
than 0.1 percent of the river’s flow, resulting in decreased habitat area and considerably reduced
plant and animal life).
247. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 287.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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considerably overestimated at 21 million acre feet.251 Indeed, the average of the river’s highly erratic flow is actually around 13.5 million
252
acre feet. Since each of the two basins was allocated 7.5 million acre
feet per year, Mexico’s “reserved” flow to 1.5 million acre feet was of253
ten difficult to fulfill. In response to the issue, a commission formed
by the Mexican government advised implementing an interdependent governmental infrastructure to evaluate the area as a single region and guarantee development through equitable and reasonable utilization.254
This issue was addressed in the 1944 Treaty between the US and
Mexico relating to the waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers,
255
and of the Rio Grande, which created an expanded International
Boundary and Water Commission that continues to function effec256
tively. The treaty guaranteed 1.5 million acre-feet to Mexico, to be
optionally increased to 1.7 million acre-feet in years of surplus.257 In
cases of extraordinary drought, however, Mexico’s share may be reduced “in the same proportion as consumptive uses in the US are reduced.”258 It should be noted that the Harmon doctrine was once
again introduced and refuted during the Congressional hearings on
259
confirmation of the treaty.
The Colorado River’s water quality is also a major problem. The
Colorado is naturally salty, a problem exacerbated by human contributions, and the water’s salinity increasingly exceeds US potability
260
standards as it travels down its course. The 1944 treaty does not explicitly consider this issue, discussing flow from “any and all sources”
“whatever their origin,” though it is clear that the need is agricultural.261 As a result, Mexico’s agricultural lands have been negatively
impacted by the delivery of heavily saline water, even necessitating
some removal of land from cultivation.262 In response, Mexican farm251. Id.
252. Id. at 288.
253. Id.; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1962).
254. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 289.
255. Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the
Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S. – Mex, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter US/Mexico Treaty].
256. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 289–90.
257. US/Mexico Treaty, supra note 255, at art. 10.
258. Id.
259. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 290.
260. Id.
261. US/Mexico Treaty, supra note 255, at art. 10, 11.
262. MCCAFFREY, supra note 5, at 291.
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ers have pumped more groundwater from the border aquifer, thereby
263
enraging Arizona farmers.
Minute 242, a 1973 addendum to the 1944 treaty, attempts to
provide some solution to the water quality problem by limiting the
264
average salinity level of water delivered to Mexico. However, as an
average annual level, water of considerably higher level salinity may
be delivered during the dry months, offset by low salinity water during the wet season.265 Salinity thus remains a problem, even with US
construction of a desalination plant in Arizona. The agreement also
limits groundwater withdrawal along the boundary aquifer and mandates joint consultation before undertaking new development.266
Though many of the elements discussed in the Convention are
already present in the Colorado River situation, the Convention
would be unlikely to have much impact as it could with regard to the
Nile River. The time has passed for Convention’s usefulness to the
Colorado River. There is already a high degree of joint cooperation,
information sharing, and non-politicized interaction between the
United States and Mexico in regards to the Colorado River. The doctrines of equitable utilization and no harm are well-established and
are derived in large part from the region. Scientific knowledge and
innovation pertaining to water use originating in this region are respected and among the best in the world. Environmental pressures
are intense from non-governmental organizations on both sides of the
border. However, there is an enormous historical legislative and judicial presence in the interactions of the seven states, combined with a
layer of international negotiation between the US and Mexico. A
more equitable utilization schema is highly improbable, as it would
require undoing a century of Congressional Acts, US Supreme Court
decisions, and international treaties. In any case, the overarching
problem will remain – there is simply not enough water for a growing
population coupled with corresponding irrigation needs, regardless of
conservation efforts. If the All American Canal is sealed (to prevent
seepage) to satisfy increasing demand in California, for example, the

263. Id.
264. Agreement Aprroving Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission Setting Forth a Permanent and Definitive Solution to the Interniatonal Problem of
the Salinity of the Colorado River, 20 Aug. 1973, 12 I.L.M. 1105 (1973), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
265. See id. at para. 1.
266. Id. at para. 5, 6.
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water source for a third of the Mexicali Valley’s farmland would be
267
removed.
Unlike the Nile, there is no win-win situation for the Colorado
River unless water use is significantly reallocated. This would most
likely involve retirement of land from agriculture to provide water for
268
burgeoning municipalities, as well as general consideration of water
269
as a commodity instead of a sovereign resource. While the Convention offers an excellent conceptual framework for the Nile, it seems
that its point of usefulness for the Colorado has passed, though it
does serve as an important reminder of the reasonable and equitable
utilization principle that should influence any further modification of
the 1944 treaty. Perhaps the conclusion can be drawn that the Convention is more valuable to developing nations, or in situations uncomplicated by extensive prior legislation or multiple governmental
levels. Thus the Convention offers considerable hope to millions of
thirsty citizens of developing countries, even if only as a probable
codification of customary international law.
V. CONCLUSION
The increasing awareness of global interconnection spotlights the
importance of international law. International water law, in particular, has become ever more significant as world population grows and
freshwater resources shrink. Successfully proven guidance is essential, as there is little room for error in the delicate balance of vital
human need, development, and conservation. From its origins in the
US Supreme Court, the long-used doctrine of equitable utilization has
been vertically borrowed into a key UN Convention, which arguably
codifies customary international law and is now referenced by important bodies such as the ICJ. The Convention offers great potential as
a framework in flexible, developing circumstances, and indeed may
return the favor to a key progenitor, the US, in providing guidance on
environmental issues. The contributions of Western US water law to
the Convention thus mark a crucial advance in international water
law, bringing us closer to solutions to sustain our “necessity of life.”

267. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
268. Id. at 293.
269. Tarlock, supra note 179, at 447–48.

